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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

JOHN EOLFE GASSMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver
License Division, Department of Public Safety,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 13849

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of November 22, 1973, PlaintiffRespondent, Dr. John Rolfe Gassman, was stopped by
Trooper Arlo Wilkinson for an alleged traffic violation
involving Dr. Gassman's execution of a right-hand turn.
After Dr. Gassman pulled to the side of the road in
response to the trooper, he was suspected of driving
under the influence of alcohol and was asked to perform
certain field sobriety tests. Thereafter, PlaintiffRespondent was placed under arrest for driving under
the influence.
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Thereafter, Trooper Wilkinson took out the appropriate forms and read to Dr. Gassman the provisions
of Utah's implied consent law as contained in IT.C.A.
41-6-44.10 (1953). After completion of his reading of
the form, according to Dr. Gassman, Trooper Wilkinson
asked Dr. Gassman if he would submit to a blood test.
Dr. Gassman indicated that he would. Trooper Wilkinson
next asked Plaintiff-Bespondent if he desired the presence of a physician to take a blood test. To this question
Dr. Gassman responded affirmatively. No mention was
made of a breathalizer test or of any other chemical
test other than a blood test.
Attempts were thereafter made to locate PlaintiffBespondent's personal physician, Dr. LaVere Poulsen.
He was unavailable. Dr. J e r r y Poulsen was apparently
on call at Granger Medical Clinic. Dr. Gassman declined
to ask Dr. J e r r y Poulsen to be present for personal
reasons. After taking Dr. Gassman tn the Salt Lake
County Jail, another unsuccessful attempt was made to
locate Dr. LaVere Poulsen.
After no further discussion of a blood test, Trooper
Wilkinson asked Dr. Gassman to submit to a Breathalizer
test, to which request Dr. Gassman refused. At this point,
without further discussion or explanation, Trooper Wilkinson left the jail.
Sometime thereafter, Trooper Wilkinson filed a
refusal affidavit with Defendant-Appellant, and on the
25th day of January, 1974, Defendant-Appellant, issued
an order of revocation as to Dr. G;assmanV driving
piiyiliges. A. .temporary restraining, order precludiiig
%
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the enforcement of said revocation order was signed byJudge Stewart M. Hanson of the Salt Lake County District Court on February 25, 1974, and was served upon
Defendant-Appellant on February 26, 1974.
Dr. Gassman's petition to review DefendantAppellant's order of revocation was heard on June 19,
1974, before the Honorable J a y E. Banks. Judge Banks
held that the evidence indicated that PlaintiffEespondent did not refuse to take a chemical test within
the meaning of U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953) and that his
driving privileges should be fully reinstated. From this
ruling, Defendant-Appellant has appealed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT DID NOT REFUSE TO TAKE A CHEMICAL
TEST WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953).

Despite a conflict of testimony as to which party
first introduced the subject of a blood test, there is no
dispute that a blood test was mutually agreed upon by
the arresting officer and Dr. Gassman. There is also a
slight conflict of the testimony as to whether the presence
of a physician was first mentioned by Trooper Wilkinson or by Dr. Gassman; however, there is no dispute
that Trooper Wilkinson undertook efforts to locate Gassman's physician, nor is there any evidence that Dr.
Gassman refused to take a blood test without the presence of a physician.
There is no evidence to indicate that Dr. Gassman
was attempting to stall for time, a factor which was
3
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emphasized in the dissenting opinion of Hunter v. Dorms,
23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969). In fact, Dr. Gassmand did not even take the opportunity to attempt to
locate his physician after Trooper Wilkinson's efforts*
had failed. On the contrary, the evidence seems to indicate that it was the arresting officer who was concerned
with time, as his regular shift had ended a couple of
hours earlier.
Once he had abandoned his efforts to locate Dr. LaVere Poulsen, the arresting officer apparently decided
that a blood test would take too long, requested that Dr.
Gassman submit to a breathalizer test, and merely left
without further adieu once Plaintiff-Respondent indicated an unwillingness to take a breathalizer test.
Trooper Wilkkinson did not attempt to ascertain whether
Dr. Gassman was refusing all chemical tests, nor did he
make any effort to inform Plaintiff-Respondent of the
consequences of a refusal.
The evidence shows that Plaintiff-Respondent was
lecL to believe by the arresting officer that he had the
right to have a blood test and that he had the right to have
a physician present while said test was performed. The
last line of the form covering the implied consent law
states that an arrested person is permitted to have his
own physician administer an additional chemical test.
Immediately after reading this line, the efforts to locate
Dr. Poulsen were undertaken by Trooper Wilkinson.
The csises as cited in Appellant's brief indicate that it is
not the arrested person's state of mind that is important.
Howeyer ? that line of reasoning does not follow when the
state of mind is induced by the arresting officer ^asiu-
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the present case. Once Trooper Wilkinson led Dr.
Gassman to believe as he did, it was his further duty
to clear the matter up prior to accepting the refusal of
the breathalizer.
POINT II
THE ARRESTING OFFICER FAILED TO FULFILL
HIS STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953).

U.C.A. 41.6.10 (c) (1953), reads in part as follows:
If such person has been placed under arrest and
has thereafter been requested to submit to any
one of the chemical tests provided for in subsections (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not
be given and the arresting officer shall advise
the person of his rights under this section . . .
(Emphasis added).
Under different circumstances it could be argued
that an arresting officer's reading of the implied consent material prior to the arrested person's agreement
to or refusal of a chemical test would satisfy his obligation as set forth in the preceding quoted portion of the
statute. However, under the circumstances of the present case where assent to a blood test had already been
made by Dr. Gassman and agreed to by the arresting
officer, said officer had a statutory duty to further explain the statute and its consequences to Dr. Gassman
once a refusal of a completely different test was made.
The arresting officer failed to follow the clear dictates
of the above-quoted statute. His initial reading of the
printed form should not be allowed to apply to any and
all refusals subsequent thereto regardless of the circumtanees.
5
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The evidence clearly indicates that Dr. Gassman
had agreed to submit to a blood test. There is no evidence that Dr. Gassman refused to take a blood test
without his physician's presence, and there is no evidence that the arresting officer requested that Dr. Gassman submit to a blood test in the absence of a physician.
With this set of facts, a person could very easily
become confused as to the consequences of his refusal to
submit to the breath test. The arresting officer had a
duty to be aware of said confusion and to clarify the
matter. Since he failed to so inform Dr. Gassman, the
statutory requirement has not been satisfied.
POINT III
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE MAKE IT A
MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN THIS JURISDICTION.

None of the cases cited by Defendant-Appellant in
its brief is applicable to the present situation and should
not be relied upon by this Court in reaching its decision.
Four of appellant's cited cases deal with the completely
different situation in which an arrested person refused
to submit to the test at all unless performed by a physician of the arrested person's choice.
Cushman v. Tofany, 36 A.D. 2d 1000, 321 N.Y.S.
2d 831 (1971), was such a case, and there the appellate
court held that an arrested person could not impose
such a condition upon his consent. In effect, his consent
was no consent at all.
Similar decisions were made in Breslin v. Ilults,
20 A.D.2d 790, 218 N.Y.S. 2d 70 (1964); Wegner v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. Eptr. 920 (1969);
6~
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and' Beetles v. Department
Rptr. 662 (1969).

of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal.

Sowa v. Hults, 22 A.D. 2d 730, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 294
(1964), was a case in which the arresting officer and the
arrested person agreed that a blood test would be given,
as in the present situation. However, in that case the
defendant refused to take the test without the presence
of his physician and further refused to tell the name of
his physician. The facts of that case boil down to nothing
more than an outright refusal, which is not the case in
the present stuation at all.
Shields v. Hults, 26 A.D. 2d 971, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 760
(1966), is closer to the present case, but it, too, is not
controlling. In that case the arrested person demanded
the presence of a physician, but said demand was refused
by the arresting officer. The arresting officer attempted
to explain the provisions of the statute, which is apparently similar to Utah's, as allowing the arrested
person to have a physician of his choice administer
another test, but that it did not give the person an unqualified right to have the physician present while
the custodial test wras administered. In the present case,
the arresting officer could have done as the officer in
the Shields case; however, he did not, and once the decision was made to allow Dr. Gassman's physician to be
present he had a statutory duty to follow through with
this approach or to inform Dr. Gassman of the consequences of his refusal to take the breath test. His willingness to accommodate Plaintiff-Respondent only served
to confuse him. This confusion should have been clarified
prior to Trooper Wilkinson's leaving.
7
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Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170 S.E.
2d 199 (1969), and Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 70 Cal. Eptr. 595 (1968), are cases in which the
arrested party attempted to place conditions upon his
consent, which, as previously statated, is the same as no
consent at all.
Maxsted v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 579 (1971), and Lampman v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 105 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1972), were both cases in
which the arrested person alleged to have refused to take
a chemical test due to confusion resulting from the reading of the so-called "Miranda Warning" prior to the
reading of the implied consent law. These cases are not
on point because here the arrested person agreed to submit to a chemical test and did not request the presence
of an attorney or request a conference with his attorney
prior to deciding.
In Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N.J. Super. 330, 237 A. 2d
903 (1968), in which the arrested person flatly refused
to submit to a chemical test claiming a lack of understanding of the consequences of a refusal, the court held
that the circumstances did not support his lack of understanding. The circumstances of the present case are very
different. Here, the arrested person gave his consent
to a particular test, and was led to believe that he had
the right to the presence of a physician. When that
presence was proved to not be possible and when the
arresting officer decided upon another type of test,
the officer should have ascertained the arrested person's
understanding of the results of a refusal to this subsequent test. The Sidler case is easily distinguishable.
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W. 2d 438 (Iowa 1968), and
Commonwealth Dept .of Public Safety v. Cheek, 451 S.W.
2d 394 (Ky. 1970), are not applicable. In the Cheek
case, the arrested person said "no" when requested to
submit to a test but claimed to have meant "yes." In
Janson, supra, the court held that the fact that the arrested person had been acquitted of the criminal charge
should have no bearing upon the refusal aspects of the
incident. Neither case has any resemblance to the case at
hand.
Likewise, the case of Westmoreland v. Chapman, 74
Cal. Eptr. 363 (1968), which is cited in Appellant's brief,
has no application to the present case. In that case, the
arrested person refused to permit a blood test to be taken
because the administering technician was not an M.D.
There is no evidence that Dr. Gassman refused the blood
test, even though it was to be administered by a technician rather than a medical person.
Even the Utah cases dealing with refusal cases are
not very close to the present situation. McCall v. Dorius,
527 P.2d 647 (Utah, 1974), was a case in which the arrested person did everything possible to stall and to show
his lack of understanding of both the Miranda Warning
and of the implied consent law. This court held that the
evidence did not uphold the arrested persons' contentions
as to certain actions by the custodial authorities and that
his driving privileges were properly revoked for one
year. It should be noted that the arresting officer in that
case did everything possible to make the arrested.person understand the nature of the action and the consequences of a refusal, In the present case, no such efforts
9:
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were made by Trooper Wilkinson. He merely left after
Dr. Gassman said " n o " to the breathalizer. In McCall,
$upra, the arresting officer read the implied consent law,
and the arrested person refused any tests. At that point,
the officer read it again and explained the consequences
of a refusal. In that case, the officer fulfilled his statutory obligations as set forth in U.C.A. 41-6-44.10' (1953).
In the present case, the arresting officer did not.
Defendant-Appellant's efforts to convert the reasoning of Hunter v. Dorms, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877
(1969), to the case at hand seems strained at best. In
that case, this court held that the arrested person did
not refuse to submit to a sobriety test when he said that
he would take a test after consulting with his attorney.
This was true even though the officer had already completed his refusal affidavit. It should be noted that even
the arresting officer in that case made sure that the
arrested person understood the consequences of a refusal
prior to acceping the same. After arriving at the station
at approximately 9:15 P.M., the arrested person was
asked to submit to a test in accordance with the provisions of the statute. But prior to accepting his refusal,
the officer took the time to once again explain the consequences of a refusal at approximately 9:48 P.M. The
officer in the Hunter, supra, case was attempting to fufill
his statutory requirements.
Thus, it can be seen that none of the cases cited by
Appellant are controlling of the present case. If anything, they i^oint out the need for an arresting officer
to attempt to obtain an informed refusal and to attempt
to clear up any confusion upon the p a r t of the arrested
IQ
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

person. This is even more applicable under the terms
of the applicable statute in the State of Utah, which
states that the arresting officer must advise a person of.
his rights after the person refuses. In the present case,
the confusion was brought about and fostered by the actions of the arresting officer; therefore, he had an added
duty to clear up the confusion that he had created.
CONCLUSION
This is a case of first impression in the State of
Utah. Prior Utah decisions and decisions from other
jurisdictions give some guidelines for the decision at
hand, but none is right on point. The controlling statute,
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953), created a duty for arresting
authorities to follow for cases such as the one at hand.
In the present situation, the arresting officer failed
to fulfill the clear dictates of this statute. His actions,
after the reading of the printed form, led Dr. Gassman
to believe that he had a right to a blood test, and that he
had the right to have his physician present while said
blood test was given. Without explanation, the arresting
officer altered the agreed-to plan of a blood test, and
requested that Dr. Gassman submit to a breath test,
which the arresting officer was to perform. When Dr.
Gassman decided not to submit to a breath test, the
arresting officer had a statutory duty to once again go
over the relevant portions of the implied consent statute
and to advise Dr. Gassman of his rights. His failure to
do so was a substantive failure to follow the statute, and
the State should not now be allowed to enforce the remaining provisions of the statute against PlaintiffRespondent
-
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Plaintiff-Eespondent respectfully concludes that the
decision of the lower court was well reasoned and should
be upheld.
Kespectfully submitted,
DON BLACKHAM and MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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